Determinants of Participation in a Catastrophe Insurance Programme: Empirical Evidence from a Developing Country by Akter, Sonia et al.
1
Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society 
52
nd Annual Conference 2008
Determinants of Participation in a Catastrophe Insurance 




3 and Salina Aziz
4
1 Corresponding author: Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia, E-mail: sonia.akter@anu.edu.au,
Tel: +61261256556, Fax: +61 2 6125 8448
2Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
3Department of Economics, BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
4Department of Economics, North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Acknowledgements
The work presented in this paper is part of the Poverty Reduction and Environmental Management 
(PREM) program in Bangladesh funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We gratefully 
acknowledge  the  heartiest  cooperation  of  the  following  organizations  at  various  stages  of  this 
research:  Bangladesh  Water  Development  Board  (BWDB),  Climate  Change  Cell  (CCC)  at 
Department  of  Environment  (DOE),  Flood  Forecasting  and  Warning  Center  in  Bangladesh 
(FFWC), Water Resource Planning Organization (WARPO) and Geographic Information System 
(GIS) cell in Local Government Engineering Department. We, furthermore, would like to thank the 
team of interviewers in Bangladesh who collected the data as part of this research.2
Abstract
The paper presents empirical evidence of the determinants of catastrophe insurance participation 
in one of the poorest and most disaster prone countries in the world. In a large-scale household 
survey carried out in 2006 we ask 3,000 residents in six different districts in Bangladesh facing 
various environmental risk exposure levels about their willingness to participate in a catastrophe 
insurance programme. Combining factors put forward in risk theory and economics, we estimate 
a model of insurance participation. We show that the household decision to participate in the 
insurance programme differs depending on both exogenous and endogenous risk exposure levels. 
As predicted by micro-economic theory, ability to pay, measured in terms of household income 
and access to credit, significantly affects insurance participation. Furthermore, among the socio-
demographic factors investigated in this case study, respondent education and occupation are 
found  to  significantly  influence  household  decision  making.  Our  study  suggests  that  low 
participation rates for catastrophe insurance in a developing country can be explained by high 
rates of illiteracy and limited access to credit. 
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Introduction
Weather related risk is a major source of income fluctuations for rural households in Bangladesh. 
Both  coastal  as  well  as  inland  Bangladesh  households  face  natural  disaster  risks  due  to  its 
geographical location and very low land elevation. Catastrophic events like riverine floods and 
coastal cyclones cause asset loss, crop damage, unemployment, diseases and fatalities once in 
every five to ten years. Following the overwhelming success of micro-credit in Bangladesh, there 
is a growing optimism in micro-insurance solutions to protect rural households from income 
shocks  resulting  from  catastrophic  risks.  An  important  aim  of  the  proposed  disaster  micro-
insurance is to spread the risks of natural disasters, especially for the poor part of the population, 
in order to better prepare them to cope with increased climatic change disasters such as floods, 
cyclones and storm surges. Whilst the use of micro-insurance to cover life and health risks is 
prevalent to some extent, the use of micro-insurance to hedge against natural disaster losses in 
rural areas of Bangladesh is still only emerging. The National Adaptation Programme of Action, 
prepared by the  Ministry of Environment and  Forests (2005), suggests  exploring options  for 
spreading natural disaster risks by investigating the potential of a flood insurance market as an 
important alternative poverty alleviation and natural disaster risk coping strategy. 
Although insurance is often referred to as an effective tool for reducing, sharing and spreading 
the risk  of catastrophic events (Bouwer and Vellinga,  2002;  Hoff et al.,  2003;  Mills, 2004), 
available  evidence  indicates  that  the  participation  in  such  insurance  programmes  is  low
throughout the world (Goes and Skees, 2003). The causes of under-insurance against natural 
disaster losses have gained substantial attention in the natural disaster and risk literature over the 
past 30 years (e.g. Cook and Graham, 1975; Kunruether, 1978, 1996; Shogren, 1990; Dong et al., 4
1996; Arrow, 1996, Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Ganderton et al., 2000; Gine et al., forthcoming; 
Kriesel and Landry, 2004). 
Kunreuther (1978) identifies a number of situations in which people fail to purchase insurance, 
even when it is available at low cost. According to the U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee 
report, less than 30 per cent of vulnerable homeowners in the USA purchased insurance against 
flood peril despite the large number of explicit and implicit subsidies provided by the National 
Flood Insurance Programme (NFIP) (US Senate Republican Policy Committee, 2006). Empirical 
evidence of the success of mitigation actions and insurance programs against catastrophic events 
is even more spurious in developing countries. A case study by Gine et al. (forthcoming) shows 
that less than five per cent of the eligible farmers in a drought prone region in India buys rainfall 
insurance. The study furthermore reveals that the offered insurance scheme failed to attract the 
target group of farmers and the insurance was purchased mainly by those farmers who needed it 
least. 
Given  the  unpredictable  and  inconsistent  nature  of  consumer  behaviour  in  the  context  of 
insurance participation against natural disasters, the current study aims to estimate an empirical 
model of catastrophe insurance participation in a developing country setting. More specifically, 
we aim to identify the core determinants of rural household decision-making to protect themself 
against natural disaster risks by participating in a hypothetical catastrophe insurance programme 
in a severely disaster prone country (Bangladesh). Our interest is specifically in the design of 
programs that have a greater participation rate. We therefore focus in this study particularly at 
identifying  the  socio-economic  factors  that  influence  the  take-up  of  a  catastrophe  insurance 
program in rural Bangladesh. Although there are numerous relevant actuarial issues associated 5
with  an  insurance  design  involved  as  well  (e.g.  premium  setting,  adverse  selection,  moral 
hazard),  they  fall  outside  the  scope  of  the  current  study.  We  are  primarily  interested  in 
determining what makes rural households decide to participate on the outset of an insurance 
programme, without knowing the technical actuarial details of the specific insurance programme. 
Econometric  modelling  of  the  decision  to  participate in  a  hypothetical  catastrophe  insurance 
programme to cover losses from natural disasters, we find our results are consistent with both 
theory and the available empirical evidence. The insurance participation decision in our case 
study varies depending on a combination of exogenous and endogenous risks. Furthermore, our 
study demonstrates the importance of education and access to credit in catastrophe insurance 
participation. The influence of especially the latter factor (credit access and facilities) has not 
been researched before to our knowledge and provides a novel perspective in our study on the 
insurance participation decision. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews previous empirical studies related to 
the current research. We then present the model that explains the theoretical framework of our 
empirical work, followed by a description of the case study and survey design. Then the paper 
gives the statistical analysis results, and offers a conclusion and recommendation.
Literature Review
Although numerous studies have examined individual protection decisions against catastrophic 
events in an experimental setting (e.g., Slovic et al., 1980; Brookshire et al., 1985; Slovic, 1987; 
Camerer and Kunreuther,  1989;  McDaniels et al., 1992;  Kunreuther, 1996;  Ganderton et al., 
2000), empirical investigation of decision making rules over catastrophic insurance participation 6
is limited. Browne and Hoyt (2000) estimate an insurance demand model for the subsidized NFIP 
in USA by using secondary data over 50 states for the period of 1983-1993. The results confirm 
the relevance of some microeconomic principles with the decision making process of catastrophe 
insurance purchase. The authors find flood insurance demand positively related to income and 
negatively related to risk premium. Household risk perception at the state level, instead of actual 
risk, is found to be an important determinant of the insurance purchasing decision. The authors 
argue that households estimate the probability of a disaster event based on their experiences and 
is hence the reason that the number of flood insurance policies sold during a year is positively 
correlated with flood losses during the previous year.
Some of the findings in Browne and Hoyt s’ (2000) study are noteworthy, especially the positive 
relationship  between risk  perception and  insurance  demand.  However,  the  estimated  demand 
model in Browne and Hoyt (2000) shows a significant positive relationship between the decision 
of insurance purchase and the availability of government aid, which is contrary to the proposition 
by Lewis and Nickerson (1989). Lewis and Nickerson (1989) suggest that availability and access 
to ex-post public relief programmes (e.g., disaster loans, grants, etc.) work as a disincentive for 
consumers to invest personal resources in protective action such as insurance. A number of other 
important  questions  remain  unanswered, such  as  how individuals  finance flood losses  in  the 
absence of  insurance,  and  how  possible  coping  strategies  (endogenous  factors) influence  the 
insurance purchasing decision.  
Kriesel  and  Landry  (2004)  estimated  a  flood  insurance  participation  model  using  individual 
household data collected through a mail survey in nine coastal counties in the US during the 7
period 1998-1999. The study shows a 49 per cent participation of eligible property owners in the 
NFIP. The study finds that the price of flood insurance (risk premium), respondent income, the 
mandatory  insurance  purchase  requirements  for  mortgage  borrowers,  the  distance  from  the 
erosion reference feature and return period of a hurricane are important determinants of insurance 
participation. Due to a lack of data, they are unable to test for the impact of disaster relief on 
insurance participation. 
Gine  et  al.  (forthcoming)  investigate  participation  patterns  for  a  rain-index  based  insurance 
programme in a drought prone region of India. The most stated reason among non-purchasers of 
the insurance is that they do not understand the insurance product, while insufficient income is an 
important reason for not buying the insurance scheme in less than a quarter of the cases. Another 
quarter of the non-purchasers are skeptical about the insurance payout in the event of a disaster. 
Besides  theoretically  expected  explanatory  variables  like  income  fluctuation  due  to  weather 
variation and household wealth, other explanatory variables that have a significant influence on 
the decision rule of adopting mitigation action are credit constraints and household familiarity 
with the insurance vendor. The study furthermore reveals that risk averse households are less 
likely to purchase insurance as a result of the uncertainty about the risk mitigation instrument that 
arises from their lack of experience with it. 
An  important  contribution  of  the  study  by  Gine  et  al.  (forthcoming)  is  the  finding  that  the 
decision-making process of participating in an insurance program depends – to some extent – on 
the socio-demographic context in which the decision is being made. One of the study’s most 
notable  findings  is  that  the  demand  for  insurance  in  a  developing  country  is  constrained by 8
consumers’ lack of familiarity with the concept of ‘insurance’. Furthermore, the relevance of 
credit constraint in confining participation in the insurance programme in relation to insufficient 
money income flow is well addressed and logically explained by the authors.   
The discussion of the literature on protective behaviour against catastrophic events indicates that 
a variety of possible factors affect the participation rule in catastrophe insurance. Here, we aim to 
extend the existing empirical analysis and provide a more comprehensive participation model that 
combines risk theory and the socio-economic context of the decision-making process. 
Analytical Framework 
Standard  expected  utility  theory  predicts  that  all  risk  neutral  or  risk  averse  individuals  will 
purchase  insurance  as  long  as  the  marginal  benefit  (i.e.  marginal  expected  utility)  from  a 
reduction in the risk exposure level exceed the marginal costs (i.e. risk premium). Essentially, the 
price of insurance or risk premium is a key determinant of the individual's decision to purchase 
an  insurance  coverage  (Smith,  1968).  However, one  of  the  many challenges  encountered  by 
researchers in estimating an insurance participation model is that data on the price of insurance 
(risk  premium)  are  only  observable  for  those  individuals/households  who  participate  in  the 
program. Therefore, incorporation of the price of insurance in any empirical participation model 
becomes  impractical,  especially in  situations  where  the  risk  premium  is  based  on  individual 
choice of the insurance’s face value (maximum damage compensation receivable by the insured). 
One  effective  solution  to  this  problem  is  to  adopt  a  generated  regressor  approach,  where 
predicted values of insurance price are used instead of actual prices (Kriesel and Landry, 2004). 9
However,  application  of  such  approaches  requires  detailed  information  about  for  example 
households’ geographical location and land elevation, which may be difficult to obtain or only at 
very high cost. Furthermore, the statistical procedure is cumbersome and ineffective in situations 
where an actual insurance market is yet to emerge. As a result, empirical studies that focus on 
insurance  participation  decisions  more  generally  often  ignore  insurance  price  (Blank  and 
McDonald,  1996;  Jütting,  2004;  Ham  and  Sheppard,  2005;  Mohammed  and  Ortmann,  2005; 
Trujillo,  2005).  An  additional  argument  to  disregard  risk  premium  in  a  generic  insurance 
participation model is the empirical evidence of the price inelastic nature of catastrophe insurance 
demand.  The  estimated  marginal  effect  of  a  $1  rise  in  risk  premium  on  the  probability  of 
insurance demand ranges between -0.259 to -0.38 (GAO, 1983; Barnett and Skees, 1995; Browne 
and Hoyt, 2000; Kriesel and Landry, 2004), suggesting that although risk premium is expected to 
play a role in determining insurance participation, the weight attached to risk premium compared 
to other relevant variables is expected to be low. 
Based on the discussion above and the key findings from the existing literature, we construct the 
following theoretical model for catastrophe insurance participation: 
Di = F (Ri , Ai (Yi, Ci), Si) Eq(1)
Equation (1) represents the decision of an individual i to participate in catastrophe insurance (Di), 
which is expected to depend on the level of risk exposure (Ri), the ability to pay the insurance 
premium (Ai), which is determined by the flow of income (Yi) and in part the access to and 
availability  of  credit  (Ci),  and  relevant  socio-economic  and  demographic  household 
characteristics (Si). 10
According  to  conventional  risk  theory  (e.g.  Shogren  and  Crocker,  1991;  Smith,  1992),  risk 
exposure consists of an exogenous and endogenous component as people are - to some extent -
able to protect themself against (the negative impacts of) environmental risks, by avoiding the 
risk involved or by taking protective  measures before being exposed to the risk or afterwards. 
Following the seminal work by Knight (1921) and more recent expositions  by, for example, 
Faber and Proops (1990) and Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992), we distinguish between two different 
dimensions  of  exogenous  risk  exposure  level:  1)  the  likelihood  of  being  struck  by  disaster 
(probability  of  exposure)  and  2)  the  consequence  of  risk  exposure.  The  first  dimension  of 
exogenous risk, the probability of being exposed, can furthermore be measured from both an 
objective and subjective perspective. Here, we use the objective probability  of risk exposure 
through i) the return period of natural disasters based on experiences in the past  and ii) the 
distance  (in  kilometres)  people  live  from  the  river  (the  closer  to  the  river,  the  higher  the 
probability of getting affected by flooding as one of the main environmental risks in Bangladesh). 
The  consequence  of  risk  exposure,  the  second  dimension  of  exogenous  risk  exposure,  is 
measured through the economic damage cost (local currency converted to US$) at individual 
household level.  
We  subsume  the  endogenous  component  of  risk  under  adaptation  and  distinguish  explicitly 
between ex ante and ex post adaptation mechanisms. Diversification of income sources is a well 
documented  ex  ante  risk  coping  strategy  in  rural  areas  (e.g.  Rosenzweig  and  Stark’s  1989; 
Brouwer et al. 2007). For this, we use the ‘number of non-nature dependent income sources’ as a 
measure  of  the  endogenous  risk  exposure  component  (the  higher  the  number  of  non-nature 
dependent income sources, the lower the expected endogenous risk exposure level). Although 11
partly exogenous at individual household level, availability and access to ex-post disaster relief, 
as proposed by Lewis and Nickerson (1989), is used as another proxy of ex-post endogenous risk 
exposure (the more access to ex-post disaster relief, the lower the risk exposure level).  
Although  no  specific  risk  premium  was  offered  to  the  respondents  in  our  case  study,  the 
participation  decision  in  the  hypothetical  insurance  programme  is  expected  to  be  positively 
influenced by respondents’ ability to pay. Survey respondents were explicitly informed that the 
insurance scheme is not free of cost. We hypothesize that households’ ability to pay is directly 
influenced by income and indirectly by access to micro-credit. Therefore, we expect both income 
and  access  to  micro-credit  to  have  a  significant  positive  relationship  with  the  insurance 
participation decision. This hypothesis is straightforward in the case of household income. From 
a  household  budget  point  of  view,  people  with  higher  incomes  are more  able  to  pay  a  risk 
premium. However, the hypothesis about the existence of a positive relationship between access 
to micro-credit and insurance participation is debatable as access to credit is often documented as 
an ex-post disaster coping mechanism (Adger, 1999). The study by Gine et al. (forthcoming) 
detects a statistically significant positive relationship between access to credit and the insurance 
participation decision. Given the widespread evidence of micro-credit playing an important role 
in poverty eradication and income generation activities in Bangladesh (Khadaker et al., 1998; 
Khadaker, 2005), we view households’ access to credit facilities as an indirect income enhancing 
factor in addition to an ex-post risk coping mechanism, and therefore expect access to credit to 
influence insurance participation in a positive way. 12
In addition to exogenous and endogenous environmental risk exposure levels and ability to pay, 
we hypothesize socio-demographic variables to play a significant role in the decision making 
process as well. Among the wide range of socio-demographic variables, we consider education 
and  occupation  the  most  relevant  ones  to  explain  household  decisions  over  natural  disaster 
mitigation behaviour. Gine et al. (forthcoming) find that a large proportion of the non-insurance 
purchasers did not buy insurance simply because they did not understand what benefit the scheme 
was  offering  them  or  how  buying  insurance  would  help  them  to  spread  the  risk  of  weather 
variability. Our hypothesis, in this specific case, is that education enhances respondents’ ability to 
understand the product even if they have very little or no prior experience with it. Therefore, we 
expect respondent’s level of education to positively affect insurance demand. 
Finally, we hypothesize that individual’s preferences are likely to be heterogeneous towards risk 
reductions  depending  on  the  occupational  cluster  the  individual  belongs  to.  Different 
occupational groups suffer varying degrees of damage as a result of the same disaster event. For 
instance,  disaster  events  are  in  general  more  likely  to  cause  severe  damage  to  farmers  and 
fishermen,  who  are  dependent  for  their  livelihood  on  weather  conditions,  than  professionals 
employed in public administration or the service sector. Therefore, insurance participation will
partly also depend upon the person’s occupation. 
The statistical model through which we aim to test our hypotheses takes the following form: 
i i i i
i i i i
Education Occup Credit Income lief
Sources I Damage river D Period R D
9 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
Re
_ _ _
    
    
    
    
…………….Eq (2)13
For a description of the variables and the expected signs of the coefficients see Table-1. 
INSERT TABLE -1 HERE.
General Survey Design 
We selected the survey sites for our study based  on the relative geographical distribution of 
different natural disaster risks in Bangladesh. Riverine flooding and coastal cyclones are the most 
common  forms  of  natural  disasters  experienced  by  rural  inhabitants  of  Bangladesh. 
Approximately  20  per cent  of  the  country  experiences  regular  annual  flooding,  while  a 
catastrophic flood can inundate more than 50 per cent of the country’s total area (Chowdhury, 
2000). The country has a coastal zone that constitutes 32 per cent of the whole country, where28 
per cent of the population lives and works (Islam, 2004). After devastating flooding in 1954 and 
1955, embankments have been constructed around approximately 23 per cent of the total land 
area of Bangladesh as part of a structural water management program since the 1960s (Mirza and 
Ericksen, 1996). 
Based on the above information and a series of key informant interviews with the Director of 
Flood Forecasting and Warning Center at the Bangladesh Water Development Board, officials at 
Climate Change Cell in the Department of Environment, the Government of Bangladesh and 
policy planners  in  the  Water Resource Planning  Organization, we  selected six  districts  from 
different  parts  of  Bangladesh  to  carry  out  our  empirical  work.  Four  un-embanked  riverine 
districts located near the two major rivers in Bangladesh (Meghna and Jamuna) were selected for 
our  study on  the  basis  of  damage  intensity levels  monitored  during the  2004  disaster  flood. 14
Furthermore,  one  district  located  inside  the  Ganges-Kobadak  project  (one  of  the  oldest  and 
biggest Flood Control and Irrigation Projects in the country)
1 and one coastal district (surrounded 
by the Bay of Bengal and lower Meghna) were selected. . The geographical locations of our study 
areas are presented in Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE-1 HERE
From the six main districts we selected seven sub-districts located close to the main rivers. Lower 
administrative units such as ‘district unions’ and ultimately individual villages were chosen from 
these sub-districts based on a random sampling procedure. Approximately 120 interviews were 
conducted  in  four  villages  in  each district  union.  In  total  around  600  household  heads  were
interviewed in each sub-district. The area-wise distribution of the sample is presented in Table 2. 
The  selection  of  households  in  each  of  the  villages  followed  a  systematic  random  sampling 
approach where every fifth household located along the main village road was interviewed. Only 
the heads of households were interviewed in this survey. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE.
The questionnaire used in this case study was developed and finalized based on focus group 
discussions and pre-tests in each of the study areas. The questionnaire design started in June and 
lasted  until  August  2006.  Around  3,000  household  heads  were  interviewed  during  the  final 
survey  from  the  third  week  of  August  until  the  first  week  of  October  2006  by  20  trained 
interviewers. The interviewers used for the general survey also participated in the pre-tests and 
were trained in a three day long training programme, followed by several pre-test debriefing 
sessions until the commencement of the final survey. The questionnaire used for the final survey 
                                                
1 An embanked area was included as one of the study sites because of the high failure rate of flood protection 
embankments in Bangladesh to protect the residents from flooding.15
consisted of around 50 questions and was divided into different sections. In the first section 
respondents are asked about their age, occupation, educational background, family size, sources 
of income, assets, standard of living and so forth. The second section comprises questions related 
to households’ experience of catastrophic events where respondents are first asked whether or not 
they suffer from climatic disasters. Those who reply positively are further asked how frequently 
they have been struck by catastrophic events, the nature and extent of damage they suffered and 
the  type  of  ex-ante  and/or  ex-post  disaster  loss  mitigation  measures  they  adopt  to  protect 
themself. 
The third section of the questionnaire introduces the respondent with a potential ‘Catastrophe 
Insurance’ that will effectively help to spread the risk of damage caused by natural disasters. 
Since an actual catastrophe insurance market in Bangladesh has not emerged yet, we construct a 
hypothetical market similar to a pre-product launch marketing survey where we ask the target 
group of clients whether or not they want to buy a hypothetically designed insurance product. 
The respondents were offered the hypothetical ‘Catastrophe Insurance’ in the following form: 
I would now like to ask you a number of questions related to the potential of introducing a 
natural disaster insurance scheme in this area. The principle of the proposed insurance 
scheme is as follows: you pay a fixed amount of money to secure possible damages of 
your house, crop, health or income for the next five years - an insurance premium - every 
week, two weeks or month depending on your preferred payment frequency. 
Only in the case of an officially acknowledged natural disaster, you will get compensated 
for losses you suffered. If there is a disaster and you claim compensation, an independent 
surveyor  will  visit  you  and  assess  the  extent  of  damage  you  suffered.  Based  on  the 
surveyor’s independent assessment you will be compensated. The maximum amount of 
compensation you receive depends on the face value of your insurance. The terms and 
conditions of your insurance scheme are protected by national law.
After this description of the proposed insurance scheme, respondents are asked whether or not 
they would be willing to participate in such an insurance scheme in order to reduce the damage 16
risk they are exposed to at that point in time. Respondents who reply in a positive way are then 
subsequently asked in a follow-up question about the kind of insurance(s) they would like to buy 
among four available options (house property, crop, health, unemployment), how frequently they 
would  like  to  pay  for  their  most  preferred  insurance  scheme(s)  and  who  they  prefer  as  the 
provider of the insurance scheme (Government, micro-credit organizations, insurance companies, 
local co-operatives). Respondents who do not agree to participate in the proposed catastrophe 
insurance scheme are asked for their reasons for not buying insurance in a follow-up question. 
The questionnaire suggests several reasons including “I do not have sufficient income to pay 
premium”, “I do not like the terms and conditions of the proposed insurance scheme”; “I am 
unable to assess the usefulness of the proposed insurance scheme at this moment”; “I do not 
believe that I will actually be compensated”; “Damage that occurs due to flooding is not an 
important  issue  for  me”  and  “I  find  other  things  on  which  I  can  spend  my  money  more 
important”. 
Sample Characteristics and Nature of the Natural Disaster Damage
Table  3  compares  the  general  demographic  and  socio-economic  characteristics  of  the  3,000 
households included in our sample with the national population statistics. All household heads 
interviewed in our survey are men. Most (86%) are born and raised in the sub-district where they 
were interviewed. The average age of the respondents is 44 years, ranging between 30 and 75 
years. About half of the respondents included in the survey is unable to read and write. Just over 
a quarter finished primary school and only 14 per cent finished high school. Each household 
consists, on average, of six family members. Almost all households owned the house they live in, 
and a majority of 58 per cent owns the land on which they grow their crops. A tube well is the 17
main source of drinking water for a majority (99%) of all households and only 17 per cent of the 
households has a sanitary latrine in their dwelling. Around half of the sample households does 
not have any electricity connection in their house. The majority of households uses leaves, twigs 
and cow dung as their main source of energy.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Around half (47%) of the sample households are involved in agricultural farming as their main 
source of livelihood, while approximately 14 per cent of the sample population works as an 
agricultural day labourer. The remainder of the sample is employed in trade (15%), transportation 
(taxi,  ferry)  (4.5%),  the  service  sector  (administrator)  (6.5  %)  and  in  construction  (3.2%). 
Average annual household income (related to the past 12 months) is about US$ 960, while half of 
the  sample  population  earns  US$  683  per  year.  Dividing  the  median  yearly  income  by  the 
average household size and 12 months, average per capita income equals US$ 12.4 per month, 
which is slightly less than the national average rural per capita income (US$ 14) (BBS, 2005). 
Average  household  damage  costs  due  to  natural  disasters  are  US$342  per  household  per 
catastrophic  event.  This  amounts  to  approximately  35  per  cent  of  average  yearly  household 
income. Median  damage  costs  caused by  natural  disasters  are US$164.  Dividing this  by  the 
median value for household income, the share of damage in household income is slightly lower, 
namely 24 per cent. The most important damage categories are crop damage (67.2%) and damage 
to house property (51.7%). Other damage categories include income losses due to unemployment 
(32.5%) and fish pond damage (11.5%). Average damage costs vary significantly across different 
occupational groups (Kruskal Wallis 
2 = 472.141; p<0.001). Figure 2 represents the distribution 
of average damage across occupational groups.18
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE.
Empirical Results
A number of interesting issues came up when examining the institutional framework of the rural 
credit market and the sample population is asked about the nature and extent of their access to 
credit. First, we find variation in our study in terms of the institutional structure of credit markets 
to which the respondents have access (formal and informal). Second, we observe variation in 
terms of the degree of accessibility in credit, reflected through the number of credit sources an 
individual household has access to (e.g., micro credit institution, relatives, friends, or the village 
chairman).  In  the  context  of  this  study,  the  question  arises  whether  or  not  these  observed
variations  in  institutional  framework  and  accessibility  to  the  credit  market  play  any  role  in 
insurance participation. In order to test this, we created four different variables [Credit (any sort 
of credit), Credit_F (formal credit), Credit_I (informal credit) and Credit_S (number of credit 
sources)] to control for credit market characteristics in our empirical model. Furthermore, we 
observe a high and statistically significant positive correlation between the consequence of risk 
exposure, i.e. economic damage costs, and average yearly household income (r=0.511; p<0.01). 
This means that, on average and ceteris paribus, high income households seem to suffer from 
higher damage costs as a result of catastrophic events. In view of the high positive correlation 
between ‘Damage’ and ‘Income’, we choose only one variable and exclude the other from the 
statistical model we presented in Section 3 (Eq 2). The summary statistics of the explanatory 
variables used in the statistical model are presented in Table 4.
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Around  half  of  all  the  households  interviewed  agrees  to  participate  in  the  proposed  disaster 
insurance  programme  in  principle  (n=1530).  Respondents  who  refuse  to  participate  in  the 
insurance  scheme  refer to  ‘limited  financial  income’  (40%)  and  ‘dislike  of  the  terms  and 
conditions  of  the  proposed  flood  insurance  scheme’  (35%)  as  the  two  main  reasons  for  not 
participating.  Respondents  denying  to  participate  in  the  insurance  scheme  due  to  income 
constraints  indeed  earn  significantly  less  income  on  average  than  groups  who  denied  to 
participate for other reasons. Regarding the disliked terms and conditions, the most unpopular 
feature of the proposed insurance scheme is that the insured will not be given any monetary 
return in case of no disaster (mentioned by 65% of the respondents who stated ‘dislike of terms 
and conditions’ as their main reason for non-participation). 
Next  we  estimated  a  binary  logit  regression  model  of  insurance  participation  in  which  the 
dependent variable takes a value 1 if the household agrees to purchase the proposed insurance 
and 0 otherwise. The discrete choice dependent variable is regressed on the theoretically expected 
independent variables using STATA 9.1. Table 5 presents the results from four different model 
specifications. The models differ because we use four different variables to control for credit 
market characteristics. All of the estimated models turnout to be significant at less than the one 
per cent significance level as measured through the likelihood ratio test, which implies that the 
estimated parameters in each model are significantly different from zero (i.e. the model with a 
constant  term  only).  On  average,  the  models  have  a  predictive  power  of  60  per  cent.  The 
individual  parameter  estimates  associated  with  the  independent  variables  identified  in  the 
statistical model in equation 2 (section 3) are all significant at the one per cent level based on the 
Wald test. 20
INSERT TABLE-5 HERE.
In  our  estimated  catastrophe  insurance  participation  model,  ‘R_period’  (the  return  period  of 
disaster  events)  has,  as  expected,  a  significant  negative  impact  on  the  insurance  purchasing 
decision, which implies that the higher the number of years it takes for a natural disaster to occur, 
the  lower  the  likelihood  of  participation,  all  other  factors  being  constant.  The  insurance 
participation  decision  furthermore  has  a  significant  negative  relationship  with  the  variable  
‘D_river’ (the distance of a household dwelling from the main river in km) suggesting that the 
further away the household lives from the main river, i.e. the lower the exogenous risk exposure 
level, the less likely the respondent is to participate in the catastrophe insurance programme. 
Both the variables ‘Relief’ (access to ex-post disaster relief) and ‘I_sources’ (the number of non-
nature dependent income sources), used as proxies of endogenous risk exposure levels are, as 
expected, significant at the one per cent level with the coefficients showing the expected signs. 
These  findings  suggest  that  households  who  have  access  to  ex-post  disaster  relief  (implicit 
insurance) and have a large number of non-nature dependent income sources (a kind of informal 
insurance mechanism) are less likely to participate in the formal insurance programme. 
We use ‘income’ as an indicator of the household’s ability to pay and as predicted by economic 
theory, we find a positive relationship between income and insurance participation. This implies, 
other things remaining the same, that a rise in household income will increase the likelihood of 
household participation in  the insurance programme.  In view of the problems  of insufficient 21
money  income  in  less  developed  rural  economies  as  in  Bangladesh,  we  tested,  as  said,  the 
influence  of  different  institutional  frameworks  and  the  degree  of  accessibility  to  rural  credit 
markets  (which  we  assume  enhances  household’s  ability  to  pay  an  insurance  premium)  on 
insurance  participation.  As  expected,  the  credit  variable  is  positively  related  to  insurance 
participation, irrespective of the institutional framework, suggesting that households who have 
access to credit (either only formal, only informal or both formal and informal) are more likely to 
participate in the insurance programme than those who do not. Also accessibility to the credit 
market (measured through the number of credit sources households have access to) is positively 
related with catastrophe insurance participation, which implies, other things being equal, that a 
high degree of accessibility in the credit market increases the likelihood of buying insurance. In 
both cases we interpret this outcome as extending household ability to pay, not as an alternative 
ex post disaster coping mechanism, which would have resulted in a negative relationship.
Finally, the socio-demographic variables, ‘Educ (education)’ and ‘Occup (occupation)’ included 
in the participation model are statistically significant and have the expected signs. Education 
positively  influences  participation  for  a  newly  offered  risk  mitigation  instrument  such  as 
insurance.  We  furthermore  find  a  positive  correlation  between  education  and  insurance 
familiarity  (r=0.216;  p<0.001),  which  indicates  that  higher  educated  respondents  are  more 
familiar with insurance. The coefficient of the variable ‘Occup’ is positive and highly statistically 
significant. This result supports our hypothesis that occupational differences within the target 
group of rural households affects the participation in catastrophe insurance due to the fact that the 
damage  cost  incurred  as  a  result  of  catastrophic  events  is  not  equally  distributed  among  all 
occupational group.22
Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of the study presented in this paper is to estimate a participation model for catastrophe 
insurance in a disaster prone developing economy. Building upon the growing empirical evidence 
regarding catastrophe insurance participation, we presented a binary logistic model and tested the 
relationship between the probability of participation and the model’s hypothesized core variables 
using data and indicators from a large-scale household survey in rural Bangladesh. Although a 
number  of  studies  have  been  carried  out  investigating  the  determinants  of  natural  disaster 
insurance participation, a systematic empirical examination that combines both risk and socio-
demographic contextual factors underlying the decision-making process is lacking in the existing 
literature. The case study areas were selected from six districts in Bangladesh facing various 
environmental  risks.  Based  on  econometric  modelling  of  the  decision  to  participate  in  a 
hypothetical catastrophe insurance program to cover any losses from natural disasters, we find 
that our results are consistent with both theory and the available empirical evidence. Novel in our 
study is the examination of credit market characteristics in relation to insurance participation. 
In our study, we explicitly distinguish between exogenous and endogenous risk exposure levels. 
The disaster return period (i.e. the probability of getting struck by a disaster event based on past 
experiences) and the distance a household dwelling is located from the main river are used as 
indicators of the exogenous  risk component. The endogenous component of risk exposure is 
measured  through  the  number  of  non-nature  dependent  income  sources,  and  partly  through 
household access to ex-post disaster relief. Our results confirm that as hypothesized there exists a 
positive  relationship  between  environmental  risk  (both  exogenous  and  endogenous)  and 23
insurance program participation. Rural households who experience a higher disaster return (i.e. it 
takes longer before they are expected to be struck by the next disaster) and who are located 
further away from the main river (low exogenous risk levels) are less likely to buy insurance. 
Rural households who have a large number of non-nature dependent income sources and who 
have access to ex-post disaster relief are also less likely to buy catastrophe insurance.  
Household income is positively related with catastrophe insurance participation, suggesting that 
well-off households are more likely to take protective action against disaster losses than less well 
off households. Credit constraints also result in lower insurance participation, confirming the 
hypothesis found recently in the literature which suggests that better access to credit increases the 
target  clients’  ability  to  pay  insurance  premium.  We  investigated  the  relationship  between 
insurance  participation  and  the  rural  credit  market  in  more  detail  than  previous  studies  by 
controlling for institutional structures and household accessibility to credit. Our results show a 
positive relationship between credit and the likelihood of participation in the insurance program, 
irrespective of the institutional framework of the credit sources or the degree of accessibility to 
credit program We argue that rather than considering micro-credit an effective alternative ex post 
disaster coping mechanism, negatively influencing the likelihood of insurance participation if it is 
viewed  as  a  substitute  for  insurance, access  to  different types  of  formal  and  informal  credit 
markets enlarges a household’s ability to pay for insurance and hence increases the probability of 
insurance program participation. 
Education also plays an important role in stimulating insurance participation by enhancing target 
clients’  understanding  of  the  proposed  insurance  market,  where  education  level  is  positively 24
correlated  with  respondent  understanding  and  familiarity  with  the  concept  of  insurance. 
Respondents who have at least high school level education are more likely to participate in the 
insurance program compared to respondents who have never been to high school or are illiterate. 
We also find heterogeneity in insurance participation across different occupational groups, where 
farmers, who depend on weather conditions for their livelihood and are more exposed to natural 
disasters, are more interested in buying insurance than any other occupational group. 
A number of important policy implications can be drawn from our study findings with respect to 
designing future micro-insurance programs to ensure higher participation rates. First, the result 
from our study indicates that households who have access to ex-post disaster relief are less likely 
to participate in an insurance program.  In order  to limit  rural household reliance on ex post 
disaster government support and increase awareness, responsibility and accountability by forcing 
rural households to take self-protection measures, a policy option to increase participation rates in 
catastrophe insurance would be to reduce government expenditures on ex-post disaster relief and 
instead  invest  this  in  subsidizing  catastrophe  insurance  programs.  Second,  the  positive 
relationship between household access to credit and insurance participation suggests that micro-
credit  and  micro-insurance  are  complementary  products  rather  than  substitutes.  Therefore, 
extending and strengthening credit facilities in rural areas can play an important role in increasing 
the take-up of prospective insurance schemes. Finally, educated respondents are more familiar 
with the concept of insurance than respondents who are not well educated or illiterate. Given the 
high illiteracy rate in rural areas in Bangladesh, radio and television are important media in the 
short term to support efforts targeted at improving household understanding of the concept of 
insurance program. In the longer term, reducing illiteracy and improving education levels are 25
expected to be important poverty alleviation mechanisms, resulting simultaneously in an increase
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Figure 1 Geographical Location of the Study Sites.31














































Variable Definition Hypothesized 
Sign
Exogenous Risk Exposure Indicators
R_Period Return period of disaster event in the past 
(once every --------year)
-
D_river Distance of household’s dwelling from the 
main river in Km
-
Damage Total damage incurred during the last disaster 
event in monetary terms
+
Endogenous Risk Exposure Indicators
I_Sources Number of non-nature dependent income 
sources
-
Relief Availability and access to post disaster relief  -
Budget Constraint
Income Log of Average yearly income in ‘000 Tk. +
Credit Access to formal, informal credit  +
Socio-Demographic Characteristics
Occup Respondent’s occupation (farmer=1, 
Otherwise=0)
+
Education Respondent’s education (high school and 
above=1, otherwise=0)
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Table 2 Distribution of sample across different districts with different risk types
District Name Sub-District name 
Types of natural 
disaster
Sample size
Comilla Homna Riverine Flood 361
Comilla Meghna Riverine Flood 240
Manikganj Harirumpur Riverine Flood 399
Bogra Sariakandi Riverine Flood 600
Pabna Bera Riverine Flood 200
Kushtia Veramara Water Logging 601
Bhola Charfassion Coastal Cyclone 603
Total 300434
Table 3 Summary statistics of respondent (household) demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics.
Respondent (household) characteristic Sample National 
average 
(for rural areas)
Male headed household (%) 99 90
Respondent average age (median value) 44 (42) 42




         Agriculture, forestry and fishery 62.5 57.6 




                                  Non-agricultural 29.2 41.3 
Trade       15.0 16.6
Ferry/taxi worker  4.5 8.5
Service 6.5 5.9
Construction worker 3.2 3.19
Households with sanitary latrine facility (%) 17.3 20.59
Households with electricity connection (%) 45 31.19
Tube-well as main drinking water source (%) 98.8 95.75
Main sources of household energy (%) Twigs/leaves/straw/dung 82.8 N/A
Average number of family members (min-
max)
5.6 (1-26) 5.19
Average household income (US$/year) (st. 
dev.)
960 (1424) 1044
Median household income (US$/year)  683
Average per capita income (US$/month) (st. 
dev.)
17.5 (20.3) 14
Median per capita income (US$/month) 12.4
Households owning agricultural land (%) 58.4 65.60
a
Average size land owned by household (ha) 0.74
Average damage per household per disaster 
event (US$) (SD)
251 (550)
a. National statistics considers farmers owning less than 0.5 hectare firm land as ‘landless’.
Source national statistics: 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 2005, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics; URL: 
http://www.bbs.gov.bd/dataindex/hies_2005.pdf  35
Table 4 Definition of variables and summary statistics
Variable 
Name
Value Description Question in the survey Mean SD Min Max
R_Period 0 to ∞ Return period of disaster 
events
Do you suffer from disaster flooding/cyclones and if 
so, how often? 
0=no, never 
1=yes, once every …………  years
4.49 2.34 0.33 15
D_River 0 to ∞ River distance from the 
dwelling in Km
How far is your house from the main river?  5.29 3.79 1.00 11.00
Relief 0,1 Access to ex-post disaster 
relief=1, otherwise=0
Did you ever receive any flood disaster relief? 0.24 0.43 0 1
I_sources 0 to ∞ Number of non-nature 
dependent income sources
What are the sources of your household income?  0.42 0.65 0 4
Income 0 to ∞ Natural log of yearly 
household income from all 
sources
How much income did your household generate over 
the past 12 months from different sources?
10.89 0.88 7.50 14.87
Credit 0,1 Household has access to 
credit=1, otherwise=0
Do you have access to credit facilities? If yes indicate 
the source/s from where you borrow money from? 
0.25 0.43 0 1
Credit_F 0,1 Household has access to 
formal credit only=1, 
otherwise=0
Do you have access to credit facilities? If yes indicate 
the source/s from where you borrow money from?
0.51 0.50 0 1
Credit_I 0,1 Household has access to 
informal credit only=1, 
otherwise=0
Do you have access to credit facilities? If yes indicate 
the source/s from where you borrow money from?
0.64 0.48 0 1
Credit_S 0 to ∞ Number of credit sources Do you have access to credit facilities? If yes indicate 
the source/s from where you borrow money from?
0.83 0.72 0 3
Educ 0, 1 Respondent went to high 
school or above=1, 
otherwise=0
Please indicate your level of education. 0.28 0.45 0.00 1
Occup Farmer=1, otherwise=0 What is the main occupation of the head of household? 0.38 0.49 0.00 136
Table 5 Binary logistic regression results (Dependent Variable: participation=1, otherwise=0)
Variable 
Name
Description Marginal Effects (at mean value of the explanatory variables)
Exogenous Risk Exposure Indicators


















Endogenous Risk Exposure Indicators





















Income Natural log of yearly household 









Credit_F Household has access to formal 
credit only=1, otherwise=0
0.074***
(0.022) - - -
Credit_I Household has access to informal 
credit only=1, otherwise=0 - 0.053***
(0.019) - -
Credit Household has access to credit=1, 
otherwise=0 - - 0.100***
( 0.021) -
Credit_S Number of credit sources - - - 0.063***
(0.013)
Socio-demographic Characteristics



















-2 Log Likelihood 3958.057 3966.474 3968.679 3958.966
Chi-square 215.88 (df=8, p< 0.001) 213.04 (df=8, p<0.001) 228.11 (df=8, p<0.001) 226.21 (df=8, 
p<0.001)
Per centage correct predicted 60.8 59.8 60.1 61.0
N 3003 3003 3003 300337